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The Logic of Collective Rating
Heinrich H. Nax*
D-GESS, Computational Social Science, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
The introduction of participatory rating mechanisms on online sales platforms has had
substantial impact on firms’ sales and profits. In this note, we develop a dynamic model
of consumer influences on ratings and of rating influences on consumers, focussing on
standard five-star mechanisms as implemented bymany platforms. The key components
of our social influence model are the consumer trust in the “wisdom of crowds” during the
purchase phase and indirect reciprocity during the rating decision. Our model provides
an overarching explanation for well-corroborated empirical regularities. We quantify the
performance of the voluntary rating mechanism in terms of realized consumer surplus
with the no-mechanism and full-information benchmarks, and identify how it could be
improved.
Keywords: rating dynamics, social influence, amazon data, voluntary contribution dynamics, wisdom of the
crowds
1. INTRODUCTION
Rating mechanisms have a straightforward positive effect on firms’ profits, while the underlying
consumers’ purchase and rating behaviors are driven by complex dynamic social influence
processes. Indeed, such processes may undermine the “wisdom of crowds,” and eventually damage
social welfare. In this note, we develop a model with which we can quantify the effects of rating
mechanisms on consumer surplus. We compare the resulting effects with the no-mechanism
and full-information benchmarks, and suggest ways in which the rating mechanisms could be
improved.
Across different types of products and online sales platforms, rating mechanisms have
been shown to improve sales [1–10] and consumer satisfaction [11], despite the issue of
fake/manipulated reviews [12–14]. From the point of view of the consumer, understanding the
representativeness of ratings is key. For that, we need to model why agents contribute and
understand which ratings are fake. Perhaps most importantly, we need to identify the role of social
influence in ranking dynamics, because social influence can undermine the “wisdom of crowds”
[15, 16] and thus lead to bad rating performance.
Review aggregation mechanisms on online sales platforms rely on consumers to engage in costly
feedback provision voluntarily. Related to the “tragedy of the commons” [17] and game-theoretic
models of voluntary contributions to public goods [18, 19], the question is how can the provisioning
of ratings be explained in light of the private interests [20, 21] of individuals to free-ride on others’
ratings without providing own feedback themselves. We shall build a model of voting behaviors
with four types of agents: egoist, altruist, reciprocator, fake. All types rely on ratings in the purchase
decision, but differ in their rating behaviors. Egoist never votes. Altruist votes so as to maximize
the rating’s informational content for future consumers. Reciprocator votes only if experiencing a
positive utility. Fake votes to boost the product’s rating, provided some cost constraint is satisfied.
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The dynamics resulting from our model are consistent with
the following four well-established empirical regularities:
1. High ratings increase sales.
2. Ratings initially decrease.
3. Thereafter, ratings increase.
4. Ratings polarize over time.
Our model departs from standard economic models of “rational”
voluntary participation [18, 19] or “rational” voting [22–24],
and instead considers opinion dynamics allowing for “social
influence” as used by sociophysicists (see reviews by Castellano
et al.[25] and Galam [26]). Closest to our study is the recent
social-influence-in-rating literature [27–30] which we synthesize
in the formulation of our model, relying on a rich model with
four behavioral types. The model explains empirical regularities
with a single model, particularly contrarian dynamics regarding
initial-rating vs. end-of-sequence-rating dynamics.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. The Model
At each period t = 1, 2, ..., a unique new agent i is drawn from
a continuum of agents. With probability πA, πE, πR, πF > 0,
respectively (such that πA + πE + πR + πF = 1), the agent is
altruist, egoist, reciprocator, fake.
Agent i decides whether to buy a product of unknown quality
q. q is drawn uniformly at random from [0, 6]. Agent i will derive
a private gross benefit from the product equal to qi distributed
normally according to N[q, σ 2] around the true quality with
some finite σ > 0. Moreover, i associates a private cost with
purchase of the product, ri, drawn uniformly at random from
[0, 6], so that his utility finally is expressed by ui = qi − ri.
The reserve utility from deciding not to purchase the product
is assumed to be zero. Hence, agent i prefers to purchase the
product ex ante if and only if Ei(q) > ri, where Ei(q) is individual
i’s expectation concerning the quality of the product (in terms of
the product’s “benefit”) and ri represents its corresponding cost.
In the presence of a rating provided by previous consumers,
τ t ∈ [1, 5], i’s prior about the utility of the product coincides with
τ t (i.e., agent i believes the “wisdom of crowds”): Ei(q|τ
t) = τ t .
If no rating has been given, i’s prior on q is assumed to be the ex
ante expected quality of q, Ei(q) = 3 (hence write τ
t = 3 for any
period t where no rating is given).
2.1.1. Purchase
An agent i (of any type) decides to purchase the product in period
t if τ t > ri.
2.1.2. Rating-Welfare Link
Given true quality q and rating τ , the ex ante welfare of purchase
is
∫ τ
0 (q − r)dr = qτ − τ
2/2, which is maximal at τ = q, where
social welfare is q2/2. Given τ = q+ δ (rating with some ‘error’),
the expression becomes q2+qδ−1/2(q2−2qδ+δ2) = q2/2−δ2/2,
which is < q2/2 and decreasing in the absolute size of the error,
|δ|.
Provided τ = q, the ex ante welfare over the whole quality
range is
∫ 6
0 (
∫ q
0 (q − r)dr)dq =
∫ 6
0 (q
2/2)dq = 36. In the absence
of rating, this welfare reduces to
∫ 6
0 (
∫ 3
0 (q − r)dr)dq =
∫ 6
0 (3q −
32/2)dq = 27. Given some erroneous rating τ = q + δ for some
δ 6= 0,
∫ 6
0 (q
2/2 − δ2/2)dq = 36 − 3δ2, which is > 27 provided
δ2 < 3, i.e., the rating is within ca. 1.7 of the true q.
2.1.3. Rating
Agent i, after an ex post experienced quality of qi that is derived
from the purchase, can vote on the product in period t so that
the period-(t + 1) rating becomes τ t+1 = τ t +
τ ti −τ
t
t+1 , where
τ ti is a choice from a standard discrete five-star voting range,
τ ti ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. (Agents who do not purchase the good cannot
vote). If the agent does not vote, τ t+1 = τ t .
The ex ante welfare-optimal voting rule is such that i chooses
τ ti so as to minimize the rating error measured by |qi− τ
t+1|. We
shall refer to voting behavior where i chooses a higher (lower)
vote τ ti such that τ
t
i > τ
t (τ ti < τ
t) when experiencing a positive
(negative) utility as reciprocative. The fake voting behavior always
gives τ ti = 5 provided the marginal impact on τ
t+1, measured
by 5−τ
t
t+1 , is larger than some constant c (cost of providing a fake
vote). The following voting behaviors are assumed (see Figure 1
for illustration):
Egoist. The egoist never votes.
Altruist. The altruist always votes welfare-optimally.
Reciprocator. The reciprocator gives a reciprocative vote
after a positive utility,
otherwise he does not vote.
Fake. The fake votes five-star if 5−τ
t
t+1 > c, otherwise he does
not vote.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Theoretical Predictions
We shall now derive the theoretical predictions resulting from
our behavioral dynamics.
3.1.1. Remark
Egoists have no impact on ratings. Hence, the rating dynamics
are predicted by analysis of the dynamic interactions between
altruists, reciprocators and fakes, and is describable as a Markov
chain. In fact, we will associate all consumers that are not
captured by these dynamics with egoism, and not analyze their
behavior in further detail. (This behavioral type is “needed” only
to argue why many consumers will never vote).
3.1.2. Fake Votes
Over-ratings due to fake voting are expected as long as 5−τ
t
t+1 >
c. Eventually, as t grows and the impact of fake votes is thus
reduced, there will be no more fake voting, which will have
seized at the very latest by t > 4/c − 1 provided c >
0 (when 5−τ
t
t+1 > c for all t even if τ
t = 1). Before, if
over-rating due to fake voting exceeds true quality by more
than 1.7, then negative ex ante welfare effects occur as too
many consumers will buy the product and experience negative
utility.
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FIGURE 1 | Voting patterns of different behavioral types. The six different voting behaviors (1 star, 2 stars, 3 stars, 4 stars, 5 stars, no vote) are illustrated for
each of our four behavioral types (egoist, altruist, reciprocator, fake) as a function of an individual’s ex post experienced quality qi (y-axis)—here, supposing ri < 4,
c = 1/7 and τ t = 4—while varying the arrival total of votes t (x-axis) that the product has thus far received.
3.1.3. Altruist Convergence
Altruists’ votes polarize over time, meaning that the support
(w.r.t. ri) over which agents vote either one- or five-star given any
level of τ t grows over time. This is a function of the diminishing
influence individual star levels have on the rating as t increases.
If all agents were altruists, then the process would converge in
expectation to the true underlying quality [31].
3.1.4. Over-rating and Reciprocation
Suppose the agent does not purchase the good because he
observed a low rating, foregoing an otherwise negative utility.
Such an agent has no way of reciprocating as only purchasers
can vote. Hence, reciprocity is restricted to situations when
the reciprocator derives positive utility from following positive
purchase recommendation. As a result, provided t > 4/c−1 (i.e.,
only reciprocators and altruists continue to vote), E(τ t+1; τ t =
q) > q because altruists at q will not increase τ t+1 beyond τ t
in expectation. Any reciprocator with ri < qi, however, which
in expectation are 50%, will increase the rating beyond the true
quality. Reciprocators with ri > qi will end up not voting at all.
Note that, as long as τ t > 5−1.7 = 3.3, this tendency to over-rate
has no negative effect on welfare compared with no-rating.
3.1.5. Empirical Regularities and Simulation Results
Empirical regularities are established on Jindal and Liu [14]’s
amazon.com data-mining project (>5 million reviews collected
during one calendar month). The short time span of collection is
ideally suited for our purposes as (absolute and relative) qualities
of products are likely not to change over the sample and thus
such phenomena likely play no role. Our focus is on “long”
rating sequences from product categories books, music, DVDs,
andmanufactured products. Four hundred and fifty two products
were randomly selected conditional on receiving >50 votes,
resulting in a sample of products with 61–1226 votes. Votes for
each product are recorded in the order they were posted. The
average number of votes is 155 (90% between 61 and 276 votes).
The impact of rankings on sales [1–10] is reflected in our data
by that fact that products attracting more votes also tend to have
higher final ratings (coefficient 0.0006, p-value<0.001).
Previous empirical analysis of social dynamics focusses on
initial ratings [27–29], the main aggregate finding being negative
trends, suggestive of initial fake reviews [12–14]. In our data,
the initial average vote is 4.35, compared, for example, with 3.89
for the 61st and 4.44 for the 277th votes. Splitting sequences
into ordered windows representing 20 subsequent ratings, we
obtain negative time trends for the first (–0.0118, p < 0.001),
second (–0.0021, p = 0.062), and third (–0.0021, p = 0.058)
windows, compared with positive trends overall (0.0002, p <
0.001), indicating a lower “turning point” somewhere between
volume 60 and 120. [Trends are positive for the fourth window
(0.0089, p = 0.876), fifth window (0.0018, p = 0.175), and
thereafter (<0.0001 but>0, p >0.9)].
Rating variation within a given sequence is typically
substantial. From first to final rating, the average maximal
difference is 1.33 (a maximum of 3.75 is reached by a particular
product). Much of this is due to initial ratings of the sequences
which may lie far from (above) the final rating, but even ratings
after the 20th reveal substantial changes. The maximal difference
between rating 20 and the end of a sequence is 0.46 on average
with a maximum of 1.60. Dependent on the total number of
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votes contributing to a rating, the interpretation concerning a
given product’s quality may therefore indeed be very different,
with implications for the realized welfare-rating link. Note that
the variation after ranking 20 is no longer in the range of welfare-
detrimental effects compared with no-rating.
The distribution of individual stars evolves as follows. Initially,
283 of the 452 star votes are five-star, 103 four-star, 29 three-star,
13 two-star, and 24 one-star. The respective 11th votes are 249,
112, 31, 20, and 40, displaying a drop in five-star votes. Thereafter,
the respective 61st vote frequencies are 237, 88, 32, 29, and 66.
Note that the sharpest drop in five-star votes occurs in the first 11
ratings. This suggests that fake reviews are likely to occur within
the first 10 votes, but not thereafter.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics in ratings and the shares of
individual star votes over time.
To test the impact of sequence dynamics on the arrival of
the individual star votes, we perform ordered probit regressions
to test how these change with ratings and volume of sequences
over time, allowing for product fixed effects due to differences
in qualities across products, for example. For the ordered probit
tests, let j denote the index of a product and i the order in
a sequence. A latent variable on each product at each order
determines the expressed rating: when the variable u
j
i falls within
a k− th interval, the i+1-th expressed rating on j is k (for the five
star ratings): r
j
i+1 = k if u
j
i ∈ (µk, µk+1) for k = 1, .., 5, where
µ1 = −∞, µ6 = ∞. To test whether the observed valence has
an influence on the next rating, we specify u
j
i = αv
j
i+βi+ δ
j+ ǫ
j
i
where v
j
i is the rating of the first i votes on product j, δ
j is the fixed
effect for product j and ǫ
j
i the noise (assumed to be i.i.d. normal).
α represents the influence of the information released in the
observed rating: α < 0 (> 0) implies that larger ratings decrease
(increase) chances that the next vote is high. The value of β
represents the impact of order, independently of the information
in the rating.
For the whole data set, we obtain a positive effect of rating
(coefficient 0.2749, p-value < 0.001) and a negative effect for
volume (−0.0003, p < 0.001). Qualitatively, the same result is
obtained for votes 1-61 (rating 0.2318, p =0.360; order −0.0041,
p <0.001). A completely different result in terms of ratings’
effects, however, is obtained for votes excluding the first twenty
21–61 (rating –0.6117, p < 0.001; order−0.0052, p < 0.001).
To test the implications of our model, we ran five different
ensembles of simulations of our model, each consisting of 30
simulations with different random generator seeds. In one of
the five simulations ensembles, each type was present with an
equal (one quarter) share of the population. In the remaining
four simulation ensembles, one type was removed, and only the
other three types were present (one third of the population each).
For all the simulations, there were 500 products (recall we had
452 in our amazon data sample). The standard deviation of the
distribution of experienced qualities was 0.1 and the cost of faking
a vote was 0.15. Simulations had an ending condition of 250,000
FIGURE 2 | Dynamics in rankings and votes. The x-axes indicate the order in which votes arrive, the y-axes indicate either the votes proportions or the average
star rating.
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(500 products, 500 votes on average each) as the total number of
votes needed for a simulation to end.
Simulation results summarize as follows. Including all types
in our model, yields similar patterns to the ones observed in the
amazon data. Excluding altruists or fakes leads to too few votes,
and to dynamics that do not match the data at all. Excluding
reciprocators (or egoists) leads to similar dynamics, but overall
to star levels that are too low (too high) compared with the
simulations that included all types. Figure 3 illustrates.
4. DISCUSSION
Social dynamics, even in the narrow context of online
product ratings, cannot be explainable by a single behavioral
model. First and foremost, fake votes have to be separated
from informative votes. Moreover, agents without social
preferences (egoists) will not vote. The remaining voting
behaviors are classifiable into altruistic/welfare-optimal
voting (in the sense of aggregate reliability) and reciprocative
voting.
Concerning fake votes, our theoretical model predicts that
these will seize to arrive after some volume is reached, during
which they may actually lead to welfare-decreasing “errors” in
rating w.r.t. the true quality of the product. Our empirical analysis
indicates that fake voting is a phenomenon typically associated
with the first 10 votes only. However, in that period, over-rating
explainable by fake votes may be in order of magnitude of over 3
of a maximum of five stars.
FIGURE 3 | Simulated dynamics. The average final ratings obtained (y-axes) as per different length of series (i.e., number of votes on the x-axes) for the different
simulation ensembles are illustrated. The simulations either include all four behavioral types (one simulation with egoist, altruist, reciprocator, fake), or three of the four
(four simulations with one type deleted).
Frontiers in Physics | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 15
Nax The Logic of Collective Rating
The initial over-rating is “corrected” by subsequent votes
(votes arriving after 40–80). Indeed, the negative trends in ratings
are reversed after the very-early fake votes are corrected for. This
correction is associated with “altruistic” voting, characterized by
a polarization of votes toward use of “extreme” star-ratings (one
and five stars). The resulting bimodality of the distribution of
stars bears similarity with box-office performances of movies
[32, 33], but the main difference of our model compared to
these studies lies in the dynamic and interdependent nature of
the emergence of bimodality in our setting. Toward the end of
rating sequence, an upward bias is introduced which stems from
reciprocative voting. Reciprocative voting is restricted to praise
of products and therefore leads to higher votes as corresponds to
the true quality perception of consumers.
Our model has several implications which are in line with
the rating-influences-sales literature [1–10]. First, very-early
ratings should be mistrusted by consumers because of fake votes,
providing rationality grounds for the empirical finding that high
volume of votes in ratings, by itself, has been shown to have
a positive effect on sales. Beyond a critical volume of votes,
however, (higher) ratings are informative and therefore also –
rationally– justify their empirically observed positive effect on
sales. However, the most informative rating typically is not the
final rating as reciprocative ratings behaviors create upward
biases. An especially informative point to consider is where
ratings’ sequences reach their lower turning point.
Finally, rating aggregation mechanisms could be improved
to explicitly maximize informativeness of the rating. There is
some recent literature on how this may be achieved theoretically
[34] and using data [35]. In terms of our findings, meaningful
corrections to the crude averaging of votes would include
discount of very-early high votes (fake), smoothing/discounting
over initial windows (fake and reciprocity), and trend correction
for very long sequences (reciprocity). We view this paper as
a starting point for serious applied and quantitative work
related to identifying behavioral types and rating mechanism
design.
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